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Introduction
A relatively little discussed decision-making problem is that of aggregating multi-agent preference orderings into a consensus ordering, in the specific case in which the agents' importance is expressed in the form of a rank-ordering. The problem of interest is characterized by the following elements:
 A set of alternatives to be prioritized (a, b, c, d, e, .. respectively mean "strictly preferred to", "indifferent to" and "incomparable to");
 An importance hierarchy of the agents, which is expressed through a linear rank-ordering (e.g.,
and not through a set of weights, as in most of the decision-making problems (Martel and Ben Khelifa, 2000; Vora et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2014) ;  A consensus 2 ordering of the alternatives, which represents the solution of the problem. Franceschini et al. (2015) classified this specific problem as ordinal semi-democratic; the adjective semi-democratic indicates that agents do not necessarily have the same importance, while ordinal indicates that their rank is defined by a linear ordering (Nederpelt and Kamareddine, 2004 ). This problem is potentially adaptable to a large number of practical contexts, in which the agents' importance prioritization is dubious and controversial: in these situations, the formulation of a rankordering is certainly simpler and more intuitive than that of a set of weights defined on a ratio scale (Chen et al., 2012; Herrera-Viedma et al., 2014; Jessop, 2014) . Possible examples are:
 Management decision problems in which agents are the members of the management board of a company/organization and their importance reflects the relevant hierarchical level (e.g., CEO, general manager(s), operations manager(s), office manager(s), etc.);
 Marketing decision problems in which agents are respondents to questionnaires/interviews and their importance reflects the relevant level of education (e.g., Ph.D., M.Sc., B.Sc., high school, etc.);  Competitions for academic positions in which agents are the members of committees and their importance reflects the relevant academic position (e.g., full professor, associate professor, assistant professor, etc.).
The problem of aggregating preference orderings, when there is no agents' importance hierarchy (fully democratic case) or it is expressed through a set of weights, is quite old and has been studied in various fields, stimulating the development of a variety of solution techniques (Fine and Fine, 1974; Fishburn, 1974; Hwang and Lin, 1987) . For example, in the field of social choice and voting theory, we recall the pioneering method by Condorcet (1785) and that by Borda (1781) , while, in the field of multicriteria decision making, the Electre (Figueira et al., 2005) , Promethee (Brans and Mareschal, 2005; Corrente et al., 2013) , AHP (Saaty, 1980) or TOPSIS (Bilbao-Terol et al., 2014) methods.
On the other hand, the ordinal semi-democratic problem has so far received relatively little attention, probably due to its specificity; we recall the contribution of Yager (2001) , proposing a practical aggregation technique (hereafter denominated as "Yager's algorithm", abbreviated as YA), and the contributions of Wang (2007) and Franceschini et al. (2015) , presenting two ameliorative variants of the YA.
These aggregation techniques, and maybe those that will be proposed in the future, have their pro and contra. For this reason, an interesting question is: For a generic ordinal semi-democratic decision-making problem, how could we identify the best aggregation technique? We are aware that it is probably impossible to answer this question rigorously, since the "true" solution for a generic problem is not known a priori (Figueira et al., 2005; Cook, 2006; Zopounidis et al., 2010) . Nevertheless, the performance of different aggregation techniques may be assessed, at least roughly, according to various aspects, such as:
 The ability to produce a solution, which is consistent with the input data;  The adaptability to a variety of input data, e.g., preference orderings including omissions and/or incomparabilities between alternatives;  The efficiency in using the input data for constructing the consensus ordering; e.g., an algorithm that focuses on the lower/upper part of the preference orderings only or an algorithm that ignores the preference orderings of certain agents cannot be considered as very efficient.
 Computational complexity.
Among the aspects above, that concerning the consistency of the solution is particularly important.
The argument of consistency has been used by Wang (2007) and Franceschini et al. (2015) to prove, at least at a conceptual level, the superiority of their variants with respect to the YA. In this context, consistency is defined as the ability of a solution to reflect the agents' preference orderings, while reflecting their importance hierarchy, i.e., giving priority to the more important agents.
In the scientific literature, various tools for consistency checking have been proposed. A common feature is that they use some measures of correlation/similarity to compare the consensus ordering with the agents' preference orderings (Ng and Kantor, 2000; Wu and McClean, 2006) . For example, popular statistics are the Kendall's tau, the Spearman's rho, Spearman's footrule, and Cayley distance; see (Lebanon and Lafferty, 2001 ) for an overview. However, the application range of these tools may be limited by several aspects, such as:
 the degree of "completeness" of the preference orderings; for example, many techniques are not easily applicable when some alternatives are tied, omitted or incomparable between each other (Brandenburg et al., 2013) ;  the form in which the importance hierarchy of the agents is expressed.
The aim of this paper is to provide a simple and practical tool to check the degree of consistency between the consensus ordering and the input data, for specific ordinal semi-democratic decision-making problems. The proposed tool enables two types of consistency evaluations:
 at a local level, by comparing the consensus ordering with the preference ordering of each j-th agent;
 at a global level, by comparing the consensus ordering with the whole set of preference orderings, taking into account the agents' importance rank-ordering, under the assumption that the most important agents should have a predominant influence on the construction of the consensus ordering.
The consistency verification is performed through the so-called p indicators, as we will show later in the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized in two sections. Sect. 2 introduces the p indicators, focusing on their construction and practical use. The description is supported by several examples. Sect. 3 summarizes the original contributions of this research, focusing on its implications, limitations and possible future developments.
The p indicators
Before getting into the discussion of p indicators, we anticipate that they are virtually applicable to every aggregation technique, since they are obtained by comparing the paired-comparison relationships derived from one agent's preference orderings with those derived from the consensus ordering. The decision of using paired-comparison relationships is motivated by several reasons:
1. They allow to express the preference between two alternatives in a natural and intuitive way; 2. They can be derived from (preference and consensus) orderings, even if some alternatives are tied, omitted or incomparable between each others. For the purpose of example, Fig. 1 illustrates the transformation of a fictitious partial ordering, with one omitted alternative (d) and two incomparable alternatives (a and e), into paired-comparison relationships (Nederpelt and Kamareddine, 2004) .
3. They could also be derived from agents' judgements expressed in other forms (e.g., measurements/evaluations on ordinal/interval/ratio scales), as long as they admit relationships of order among the alternatives. 
General description
Tab. 1 presents a summary scheme of the proposed indicators. The p j indicators, associated with each j-th of the total m agents, allow to assess the consistency at a local level, while indicators p A and p B -in turn aggregated into p O -allow to assess the consistency at a global level; the combination of all these indicators enables a structured evaluation of the degree of consistency between consensus ordering and input data, in a generic ordinal semidemocratic decision-making problem. These two types of indicators are defined and described in Sects. 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 respectively.
p j indicators
A preliminary operation for determining the p j indicators is constructing a table, which contains the paired-comparison relationships obtained from the agents' preference orderings and the consensus ordering. For the purpose of example, let us consider the fictitious decision-making problem in Tab.
2, in which m = 4 agents formulate their preference orderings concerning n = 5 alternatives (a, b, c, d and e); the importance hierarchy of agents is expressed in the form of the rank-ordering Agents' preference orderings are transformed into the four sets of paired-comparison relationships reported in Tab. 3(a). Likewise agents' preference orderings, the consensus ordering is transformed into the set of paired-comparison relationships reported in the last column of Tab. 3(a).
Tab. 2. Input and output data of a fictitious decision-making problem concerning the aggregation of multi-agent preference orderings of five alternatives (a, b, c, d and e) into a consensus ordering.
Each j-th agent is associated with an indicator (c j ) corresponding to the number of paired comparisons, which are usable for evaluating the compatibility between the j-th preference ordering and the consensus ordering. Conventionally, we classify as usable a paired comparison not producing any relationship of incomparability ("||"), neither in the agent's preference orderings, nor in the consensus ordering, but only relationships of strict preference (">") or indifference ("~").
Obviously,   n j C c 2 j-th agent, being n C 2 = n·(n -1)/2 the total number of paired-comparisons for n generic alternatives (e.g., 10 in this specific example, since n = 5).
Subsequently, we construct a "consistency table" (in Tab. 3(b)), which turns the paired-comparison relationships of each agent into scores, according to the scoring system in Tab. 4. The conventional choice of assigning 0.5 points in the case of weak consistency is justified by the fact that this is the intermediate case between that one of full consistency (with score 1) and that of full inconsistency (with score 0). The consistency table also reports the sum of the scores (x j ) relating to each j-th agent.
Next, for each j-th agent, the portion of consistent paired-comparisons can be calculated as:
being x j the total score related to the j-th agent;
c j the number of usable paired comparisons related to the j-th agent.
It can be noticed that the non-usable paired comparisons do not influence the evaluation of consistency, since they have no contribution neither in the x j nor in the c j terms.
Similarly to other existing measures -e.g., the Kendall's tau ( j ) and the Spearman's rho ( j ) -p j can be interpreted as an indicator of correlation between pairs of orderings (Kendall, 1970; Spearman, 1904 
In this sense, p j can be considered as a variant of  j . Two advantages of p j are: (i) the simplicity in the calculation, even for orderings with tied, omitted or incomparable alternatives, and (ii) the immediate meaning. Note: c j is the number of "usable" paired-comparisons; x j is total score of the j-th agent; p j is the ratio x j /c j .
Tab. 3. (a)
Tab. 4. Scoring system used in the construction of the "consistency table". Case Score 1. Full consistency, i.e., identical relationship of strict preference (">") or indifference ("~"). 1 2. Weak consistency, i.e., consistency with respect to the weak preference relationships only ("> or ~", i.e., strict preference or indifference); e.g., when comparing the relationship a > b with a ~ b. Moreover, the consensus ordering seems to reflect the agents' importance hierarchy relatively well, since p j values tend to decrease as the agents' importance decreases; this means that the more important the agents, the higher the consistency between consensus ordering and preference orderings. Sect. 2.1.2 will go into this issue.
p A , p B and p O
A rough indication of the overall compatibility between the consensus ordering and the whole set of preference orderings is given by p A , defined as the ratio of x j (i.e., the sum of the total scores x j ) and c j (i.e., the total number of usable paired comparisons): 
The comparison between the two orderings is carried out by repeating the exercise seen in Sect. 2.1.1 when constructing the p j indicators, namely: (i) decomposing the two orderings into paired-comparison relationships, (ii) comparing them and assigning some scores according to the conventions in Tab. 5
, (iii) determining the sum of the x B scores, and (iv) constructing p B , defined as:
3 Two are the differences between the scoring system in Tab. 5 and that in Tab. 4. The first is that the new scoring system does not include the possibility of incomparability, since the p j ordering and the agents' importance rankordering are both linear and do not include any incomparability relationship (Nederpelt and Kamareddine, 2004 ). The second is that the new scoring system is more "indulgent" than that in Tab. 4, since it assigns a unitary score even the case of weak consistency (i.e., consistency with respect to the relationship "> or ~"). This choice is justified by the fact that it is very unlikely to expect a strict correspondence between relationships of indifference, in both the importance rank-ordering and the p j ordering; in fact, two p j values are considered indifferent only if they coincide exactly.
Moreover, the adoption of the scoring system in Tab. 4 could lead to paradoxical situations, such as the following one:
three agents formulate three preference orderings, which are completely consistent with the consensus ordering, i.e., p 1 = p 2 = p 3 = 100% (this would be the extreme case where all the preference orderings and the consensus ordering coincide), and the agents' importance rank-ordering is D 1 > D 2 > D 3 . Applying the scoring system in Tab. 4, we would obtain p B = 50%, which is an unduly penalizing result for this situation of ideal consistency; on the other hand, when applying the scoring system in Tab. 6, we would obtain p B = 100%, eliminating the paradox. the number of usable paired comparisons (i.e., 6 in this case). We observe that both the orderings are linear and do not include any incomparable alternatives. Tab. 5 shows the paired-comparison data relating to the two orderings and the so-called consistency string (4) , which contains the corresponding scores. For the problem exemplified, the value of p B = 100% indicates excellent compatibility between the consensus ordering and the p j ordering.
Pushing to the extreme the synthesis, the two complementary indicators p A and p B can be synthesized into an overall indicator:
The synthesis by the min() operator allows condensing the results of the consistency analysis into a single number. It is implicitly assumed that the aspects described by p A and p B are equally important. 
Note: c B is the number of "usable" paired-comparisons; x B is the relevant total score; p B is the ratio x B /c B .
Comparisons between different solutions
This section illustrates the use of the p indicators for comparing the solutions obtained from different techniques, which are applied to the same ordinal semi-democratic decision-making problem. Let us consider a fictitious problem, in which five different alternatives (a, b, c, d, and e) are examined. For more information on the YA and the EYA, we refer the reader to Yager (2001) and Franceschini et al. (2015) , respectively.
In spite of being originated from the same input data, the two consensus orderings are deeply different from each other, except for the fact that alternative b is in the second position and e is in the last position for both of them. Which consensus ordering better reflects the input data?
At a qualitative level, the second one is probably better than the first one, as it is not so dissimilar from the preference orderings of the two most important agents (i.e., D 1 and D 2 ). At a quantitative level, the local consistency can be assessed through the p j indicators. To facilitate the construction of these indicators, preference orderings are turned into paired-comparison data (see the first four columns in Tab. 8). In this specific case, the preference orderings are all linear (and not partial), therefore they will not include any omissions or incomparabilities between the alternatives.
Likewise the preference orderings, the two consensus orderings are turned into paired-comparison data (see the last two columns of Tab. 8).
In Sects. 
Consensus orderings
Tab. 8. Paired-comparison data, related to the three agents' preference orderings and the two consensus orderings in Tab. 7.
Paired comparison
From agents' preference orderings (Kendall, 1970; Spearman, 1904) . The calculation of p j , compared to that of  j and  j , is more practical for partial preference orderings (Franceschini et al., 2007) ; also, p j probably has a more immediate meaning. 
From consensus orderings
D 1 D 2 D 3 YA EYA a, b a > b b > a b > a a > b b > a a, c c > a c > a a > c a > c c > a a, d a > d a ~ d a ~ d a > d a > d a, e a > e a > e a > e a > e a > e b, c c > b c > b b > c b > c c > b b, d b > d b > d b > d b > d b > d b, e b > e b > e b > e b > e b > e c, d c > d c > d d > c d > c c > d cScores D 1 D 2 D 3 a, b 1 0 0 a, c 0 0 1 a, d 1 0.5 0.5 a, e 1 1 1 b, c 0 0 1 b, d 1 1 1 b, e 1 1 1 c, d 0 0 1 c,D 1 , D 2 D 1 > D 2 D 1 > D 2 D 1 , D 2 1 D 1 , D 3 D 1 > D 3 D 3 > D 1 D 1 , D 3 0 D 2 , D 3 D 2 > D 3 D 3 > D 2 D 2 , D 3 0 c B 3 x B 1D 1 , D 2 D 1 > D 2 D 2 > D 1 D 1 , D 2 0 D 1 , D 3 D 1 > D 3 D 1 > D 3 D 1 , D 3 1 D 2 , D 3 D 2 > D 3 D 2 > D 3 D 2 , D 3 1 c B 3
Graphical representation through the p-diagram
The so-called p-diagram, in Fig. 3 , provides a practical "snapshot" of the comparative analysis between the solution from the YA and that from the EYA. The profile of the EYA solution is significantly higher than that of the YA solution, from almost all points of view, denoting a significantly higher consistency with input data. 
Discussion
The p indicators represent a simple and intuitive tool for assessing the consistency between consensus ordering and agents' preference orderings, in ordinal semi-democratic decision-making These indicators are very versatile since they can be applied in the presence of omissions and/or incomparabilities between alternatives, both in the agents' preference orderings and consensus ordering. Theoretically, they could be applied even in the case in which the agents' judgements and/or the solution of the problem were expressed in other forms -such as measurements/evaluations on ordinal/interval/ratio scales -as long as they could be transformed into paired-comparison relationships. Other advantages of p indicators are (i) the immediate meaning and (ii) the relatively simple calculation.
It was also shown that the p indicators may assist in comparing the solutions generated by two (or more) techniques, in a specific ordinal semi-democratic decision-making problem. To this end, the representation provided by the p-diagram is particularly useful and effective.
The p indicators were presented as a passive tool for checking the consistency of the solution of one or more aggregation techniques, in a specific decision-making problem. Reversing this perspective, they could be used actively, i.e., as parameters to maximize, for identifying the "optimal (6) " consensus ordering(s). A possible approach would be that one based on the maximization of p O , i.e., the overall synthesis indicator. In this case, the optimal consensus ordering -which is that one for which p O assumes the maximum possible value (i.e.,
MAX O p
) -may be determined by: (i) automatically generating all the possible solutions to a specific problem, through ad hoc software, p value will tend to increase (since it will be easier to find a consensus ordering, which is compatible with the whole set of agents' preference orderings and their importance hierarchy), while in others in which the differences are greater, it will tend to decrease (since it will be more complicated to find a consensus ordering, which is compatible with the whole set of agents' preference orderings and their importance hierarchy). In this sense,
MAX O p could be also seen as a measure of the degree of "dissimilarity" between the agents' preference orderings.
Future research will aim at deepening this aspect. Also, we will propose new tools for complementing the p indicators and enriching the verification of the solutions generated by different aggregation techniques. Finally, we plan to generalize the p indicators so that they are adaptable to the majority of decision-making problems, in which (i) agents can use different formats to express their preferences and (ii) their importance hierarchy is expressed through a set of weights.
